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ACQUISITION OF MODULAR LOW EARTH ORBIT SATELLITES 






The primary objective of this study is to investigate and analyze improved multi-source 
intelligence (multi-INT) data collection through low latency, cross-communicating, 
modular low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites.  This research examines the current acquisition 
process and system engineering approach to multi-INT data collection via command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) satellites, specifically focusing on time (production time and system life) and 
cost.  The project introduces several proposed low latency, cross-communicating, 
modular LEO satellite systems for improved multi-INT data collection.  It then provides a 
comparison of geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellite life-cycle costs versus the life-
cycle costs of LEO satellites and analyzes the maintainability, upgradeability, 
interoperability, reliability, and safety/security (MUIRS) benefits of smaller, faster-to-
orbit satellites that could be launched in weeks or months.  
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The use of satellites for multi-source intelligence (multi-INT) data collection 
allows the military to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) on any 
target or area around the globe.  The military advantages of deploying satellite sensor 
systems are undeniable, but the time, cost, and resources required to produce current 
command, control, communications, and computers (C4) ISR satellites are too great to 
meet operational needs and do not support maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, 
reliability, and safety/security (MUIRS) issues.  A transition is needed from the existing 
single-satellite architecture to a constellation architecture of low-cost, small satellites, as 
depicted in Figure 1.    
 
 
Figure 1.   A Depiction of the Proposed Satellite Architecture Transition (After 
Goshorn, D., 2011) 
 
In computer data networking arenas, a constellation (as a set of mobile nodes) can 
be called a cluster of mobile nodes.  My electrical engineering thesis takes a networking 
approach for its small satellite constellation architecture and uses the cluster networking 
terminology (Staab, 2012).  This joint applied project will refer to constellations of small 
satellites and clusters of small satellites interchangeably.   
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A. BACKGROUND 
Most acquisition professionals agree that the current defense satellite acquisition 
process is excessively expensive. Satellite systems for C4ISR and communications will 
cost tens of billions of dollars more than the $25 billion the military is spending on 
hundreds of thousands of new radios. The Army’s program for a “war net” has a $120 
billion price tag on its own.  After some 50 years of launching large, complex, multi-
million-dollar spacecraft, the military and industry are rethinking the way satellites are 
built and acquired.  During the past five decades, military and intelligence satellites have 
grown bigger because program managers wanted to fit as many capabilities as they could 
onto one spacecraft. It was expensive to launch these satellites and, once they went up, 
they could be in orbit for as long as 15 years.  Congress has also singled out the 
cumbersome and expensive process of building satellites as a prime example of how 
major acquisition programs can go wrong. The costs of these programs have typically 
spiraled out of control during the past decade and delivery milestones have not been met, 
resulting in the tarnished reputation on Capitol Hill of the national security space 
community (Best, 2010). 
One emerging future alternative is a system that is rapidly developed and 
delivered, and that can be quickly replaced (e.g., smaller, faster-to-orbit satellites that 
could be launched in weeks or months).  A different concept would require launch 
systems that could lift off more quickly than current rockets and less complex spacecraft 
that could be assembled from off-the-shelf components in a plug-and-play fashion 
depending on mission requirements.  Additionally, the demand for delivering high-
quality software support has become paramount.  In short, it has become the largest life-
cycle cost driver and comprises a substantial portion of system risk.  Developing 
supportable software is one of the most important criteria for ensuring success once a 
system has been fielded.  Today’s net-centric environment may be both enabling and 
multiplying these challenges.  In the specific case of a satellite system, the changes, fixes, 
and upgrades that are always happening in other systems are limited by the inability to 
physically access the system—changes can only be accomplished through remote access. 
The defense establishment’s ability to support major software-intensive systems is a 
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crucial mission requirement.  The success of net-centric systems depends on it (Goshorn, 
R., Goshorn, D., Goshorn, J., & Goshorn, L., 2011). 
Moore’s law (the observation that over the history of computing hardware, the 
number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years 
resulting in the same computing capability in a device half the size of its predecessor) 
predicates utilizing a network of low-cost, small modular low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites 
rather than launching a heavy and expensive single satellite with a limited coverage area 
that is difficult or impossible to maintain, upgrade, or interface with new technology.  
The latter is also more vulnerable to data integrity loss and data interception because of 
the constant communication to terrestrial base stations.  Unfortunately, heavy, single 
satellites need to be built to near ultra-reliability (99.999%) due to massive repair and 
replacement costs (B. Naegle, personal communication1, August 2011).  
A MUIRS analysis of low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO satellites 
may reveal benefits in all categories.  Low latency allows human-unnoticeable delays 
between an input being processed and the corresponding output providing real-time 
characteristics.  Modularity and cross-communication allow for a scalable distribution of 
the processing resources in small satellites needed to produce the results that can be 
attained with a single large satellite.  Small modular LEO satellites have a short life cycle 
and do not require maintenance once in orbit.  Their short life cycle requires them to be 
replaced frequently and enables frequent upgrades and interoperability updates to 
maintain interoperability with new technologies in a constantly changing net-centric 
environment.  The reliability required of each individual cross-communicating small 
satellite is far less than that required of a single large satellite—any failed satellite can be 
compensated by another satellite in its network.  This configuration also enables greater 
safety and security for the system.  
                                                 
1 From class lecture notes: Acquisition of Embedded Weapon System Software (MN3309), Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE 
My objective in this joint applied project is to investigate and analyze improved 
multi-INT data collection through low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO 
satellites.  Specifically in this research, I examine the current acquisition process and 
system engineering approach to multi-INT data collection via satellite.  In the project, I 
provide a comparison of geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellite life-cycle costs 
versus the life-cycle costs of LEO satellites and analyze the MUIRS benefits of smaller, 
faster-to-orbit satellites that could be launched in weeks or months. 
The time, cost, and resources required to produce current command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
satellites are too great to meet operational needs and do not support MUIRS issues.  I 
identify and enumerate the current C4ISR acquisitions process, specifically focusing on 
time (production time and system life) and cost.  Additionally, I introduce several 
proposed low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO satellite systems for improved 
multi-INT data collection.  Finally, I justify the need for a transition to the acquisition of 
modular LEO satellite systems for improved multi-INT data collection by establishing 
and quantifying the benefits of such systems across the previously enumerated 
parameters as compared to the current C4ISR acquisition process. 
C. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
As part of this research, I performed a system comparison of current GEO and 
proposed LEO C4ISR satellites, focusing on the following parameters: time (production 
time and system life), cost, and MUIRS attributes. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
I introduce my topic with some background information and provide my purpose 
and approach in Chapter I.  Chapter II comprises a literature review where I look at 
research that has been conducted to support my topic including satellite configuration and 
orbit selection, the systems engineering impact on cost, and commercial off-the-shelf 
alternatives.   
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I discuss defense satellite acquisition in Chapter III.  I begin by offering a brief 
introduction to satellite orbits, and subsequently examine several current DoD satellite 
systems and their associated orbits and missions.  Then, I offer several alternative 
systems with a different orbital selection.   
In Chapter IV I present my analysis, focusing on the following parameters: time 
(production time and system life), cost, and MUIRS attributes.  After my analysis, I 
provide my conclusions.   
Chapter V contains my recommendations for a transition from the current systems 
discussed in Chapter III Section A to the alternative systems proposed in Chapter III 
Section B.  These recommendations are supported by the comparative analysis and 
conclusions in Chapter IV.  Finally, I conclude Chapter V by summarizing my work and 
offering areas for future work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been much research done in the area of satellite development, 
employment, improvement, and acquisition.  During my literature review, I found several 
research papers that supported the objective of this project, which is to investigate and 
analyze improved multi-INT data collection through low latency, cross-communicating, 
modular LEO satellites.  Specifically, the literature review confirms this project’s three 
fundamental approaches of selecting LEO orbit, utilizing interconnected satellite 
constellations/clusters, and reducing system cost. 
A. SATELLITE CONFIGURATION AND ORBIT SELECTION 
In the first project I reviewed, Tactical Satellite (TacSat) Feasibility Study: A 
Scenario Driven Approach (Davis et al., 2006), I examined the cost and operational 
feasibility of developing a tactically controlled, operationally responsive satellite system. 
The study was a systems engineering capstone project and their approach made use of 
systems engineering practices based on the Space Mission and Analysis and Design 
(SMAD) process authored by Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz (1999).  The authors 
chose a specific mission scenario, the Philippine Sea Scenario, to guide and bound the 
analysis. They used the scenario’s high-level mission requirements to develop system 
requirements by conducting a gap analysis to discover which of the military requirements 
were not well served by existing tactical systems, such as Global Hawk. Then they 
selected appropriate payloads, orbits, and constellation sizes to meet the requirements. 
They also examined the concept of operations (CONOPS) and ground infrastructure 
established to support such a mission.  Their scenario provided insights into operations 
and military utility as well as into the estimated costs for such a system.  
The authors determined the natural shelf life of spacecraft and launch vehicles 
required for regularly scheduled launches of TacSats.  They then calculated that those 
regularly scheduled launches would, in turn, lead to standardized yearly costs associated 
with their TacSat program scenario and also drive down per unit costs as more satellites 
were produced. They concluded that their proposed scenario would also encourage the 
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rapid development of new satellite technologies in a growing market.  For cost 
estimation, they cited the procurement and operational costs of a TacSat system to be 
about $65 million (2006 dollars) for a constellation of two satellites. They also noted that 
the operations costs of a tactical satellite system can be significantly less than the Global 
Hawk system when operated continuously over a one- to two-year period (Davis et al., 
2006). 
I found that their project supported several areas of my research.  First, they found 
that the satellite orbits with the most utility for ISR are in LEO between 400–500 
kilometers.  Additionally, they determined that small satellite constellation sizes of two to 
four satellites provided acceptable ISR coverage and revisit times.  Satellite “revisit” time 
is the time elapsed between observations of the same point on Earth by a satellite; it 
depends on the satellite’s orbit, target location, and swath of the sensor.  Revisit is related 
to the same ground trace; a projection on to the Earth of the satellite’s orbit. Revisit 
requires a very close repeat of the ground trace.  In the case of polar/hi inclination low 
Earth orbiting reconnaissance satellites, the sensor payload must have the “variable 
swath” to look longitudinally (east-west, or sideways) at a target, in addition to direct 
over-flight observation, looking nadir.  Their findings support my proposal for a 
constellation architecture of small satellites in LEO orbit.  Also, they demonstrated that 
there are tactical scenarios in which space capabilities provide military utility and cost 
effectiveness above what is provided by traditional tactical assets such as unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly when large operational areas are involved and long 
periods of service are required.  
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IMPACT ON SATELLITE COST 
Next, I examined the systems engineering approach to examine its impact on cost 
in satellite acquisition.  In the thesis A study on Improving United States Air Force Space 
Systems Engineering and Acquisition (Stahr, 2006), the author studied the common issues 
that have impacted the ability of the United States Air Force (USAF) to cost effectively 
acquire satellite systems.  He found that, indeed, systems engineering is a vital element of 
systems acquisition, yet, as a result of previous Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF 
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policies and practices, many government systems engineers lack the systems engineering 
and management skills required to successfully execute national security space programs.   
I reviewed the author’s analysis of the differences between the traditional DoD 
systems acquisition and the national security space systems acquisition processes in 
which he investigated previous national efforts to improve these processes.  Again, I 
found that the author’s conclusions supported my research.  He used the results of his 
analysis and the findings from his review of successful and struggling space programs to 
discover trends.  Specifically, he found that to improve the management skills of USAF 
systems engineers, and thereby improve the national security space systems acquisition 
process, the role of the government systems engineer should be defined as one of a risk 
manager, able to efficiently perform systems engineering in support of the space systems 
acquisition process (Stahr, 2006). 
C. COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF ALTERNATIVE 
In support of my first proposed alternative architecture of a constellation of 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions for low-cost C4ISR, I reviewed a paper that 
sought to determine the possibility of an alternative for government-developed satellites 
that produce high-resolution imagery. The study focused on the concept of the U.S. 
government purchasing proven and successful commercial satellites with minimal non-
recurring engineering costs to help augment current national systems. The benefit of this 
alternative is the reliability and affordability of a system that is currently used in space, 
therefore reducing a significant amount of risk as well as production time. A constellation 
of extremely small commercial satellites with short life cycles that are reconstituted on a 
monthly or quarterly cycle could also invigorate the commercial satellite work force and 
allow for better production of future systems. Conversely, the useful lifetime of GEO 
satellites averages about 14–15 years, a limit primarily imposed by the exhaustion of 
propellant aboard.  The propellant is needed for “station-keeping”—maintaining the 
satellite in its orbital slot and in-orbit orientation, or attitude, so that its antennae and 
solar panels are properly pointed.   
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In the paper A Commercial Architecture for Satellite Imagery (Didier, 2006), 
Didier evaluated constellation design factors such as orbit types, number of satellites, and 
life cycle and ground segment implementation.  He provided a coverage capability 
evaluation to determine how a commercial system would be able to fulfill national 
imagery collection requirements.  He also created eight different constellation types, 
ranging in size from one to 12 satellites.  His proposed satellite orbit analysis settled on a 
sun-synchronous polar elliptical orbit at 185 km by 700 km, using an existing commercial 
satellite with a 0.6 meter optic.  This provided imaging with a resolution range between 
10–37 inches. The largest constellation of 12 satellites provided a daily area collection of 
43,000 square kilometers, 150 point images for a region the size of Iraq, and had an 
estimated $1 billion to $2 billion (2006 dollars) annual life-cycle cost. The revisit time 
for mid-latitude targets was approximately one day at 10-inch resolution (Didier, 2006). 
D. COTS APPLICATIONS NEAR GEO 
Having seen the utility of small COTS satellites in the previous literature, I looked 
at their ability to perform all the functions that larger satellites currently perform.  The 
literature reviewed thus far has also intimated that small COTS satellites are less 
expensive, thus offering a lower cost/benefit risk in case they fail before the expected end 
of their mission design life.  In the next paper I examined, Smaller Satelite Operations 
Near Geostationary Orbit (Erdner, 2007), Erdner observed the current technological 
ability of small satellites to perform covert space control and space situational awareness 
missions near geostationary orbit.   
The author’s investigation determined whether space-qualified COTS components 
and current technology could be used to build small, covert satellites.  The largest 
satellite was sized by the author to be undetectable from Earth-based sensors.  He 
subsequently selected CubeSat (a discrete but scalable 1 kg 100 x 100 x 100 mm cuboid 
spacecraft unit) sizes to determine how small a satellite could be built with COTS 
components and current technology to perform an ISR mission.  He then performed a 
comparative analysis to determine how the small satellites could be cost effectively 
launched to orbit and a cost estimate to determine the entire life-cycle cost for each 
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satellite size, excluding launch and integration segments. Using that information, he 
determiend the best satellite size to effectively conduct the optical survey mission was the 
5U CubeSat constellation (Erdner, 2007).  
E. COMPARISON OF COST EFFECTIVENESS 
Finally, to support my advocation for the use of small, interconneted clusters of 
LEO satellites to replace large, costly GEO satellites for multi-INT data collection 
offered in my introduction, I reviewed other lower altitude options.  In Collier and 
Kacala’s (2008) thesis, A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Tactical Satellites, High-Altitude 
Long-Endurance Airships, and High and Medium Altitude Unmanned Aerial Systems for 
ISR and Communication Missions, they offer that the DoD has focused its acquisition and 
procurement efforts on obtaining new communications and ISR platforms that can help 
lessen shortfalls and possibly exploit new, untapped resources. 
Recently, there has been an increased focus on new technology, such as tactical 
satellites or high-altitude, long-endurance airships, as a way to increase communications 
and intelligence collection capacities.  Likewise, advances in the capabilities of medium-
altitude and high-altitude unmanned aerial systems (UASs) have resulted in a more 
prominent role for them on today’s battlefield.  Each of these vehicles has a unique niche 
in today’s military, but the increasing capabilities of each are beginning to create some 
expensive, non-value-added overlap instead of offering desirable redundancy in military 
capabilities. 
In the Collier and Kacala (2008) study, they conducted a cost-effectiveness 
analysis on these systems for use as a persistent communications and ISR platform.  In 
particular, they measured the effectiveness of each in order to make a comparison.  Using 
the strengths of each system from the comparison, they offered possibilities to increase 
the overall effective use of the three combined to maximize performance and cost.  
TacSats, because of their high altitude, had the greatest access but not the greatest 
coverage.  ISR satellites are normally placed in LEO to maximize their imaging 
resolution.  An example would be the IKONOS Earth-imaging satellite.  At 680  
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kilometers altitude, the IKONOS has a very large access area; however, the images that 
IKONOS provides are typically 121 km2—much smaller than the actual access area 




III. DEFENSE SATELLITE ACQUISITION 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (Schwenn, 
Brink, Mebane, Seales, & Wintfeld, 2009), current weapon systems development 
programs are overrunning 42% in development cost and 25% in production cost, and are 
reaching initial operating capability, on average, 22 months behind schedule.  These 
figures are not inconsistent with Norman Augustine’s (1997) assessment of programs in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which, at completion, were 52% over in combined 
development and acquisition cost and 33% behind in schedule.  The majority of the 
programs in the GAO report (Schwenn et al., 2009) were still in development and will 
presumably continue to fall further behind schedule and become more expensive, 
whereas the Augustine assessment used only completed programs, resulting in his higher 
numbers. 
Collopy (2006) observed that the requirements allocation process naturally brings 
about cost growth and schedule delays of an order that is consistent with Augustine’s 
observations.  The effect occurs mainly because engineers who are asked to maximize the 
probability that a component will meet its allocated requirements will often find that the 
safest design is one that just barely meets most of the requirements.  The result is a 
marginal system that needs several redesigns or major changes to achieve functionality.  
Every redesign increases system development time and cost, and most redesigns add to 
the unit production cost.  On the other hand, a design team assigned to maximize design 
value is driven to choose designs that far exceed the levels of typical allocated 
requirements. The result is a robust design that is functional or nearly functional on the 
first go-round. This avoids long iterative development schedules and the attendant cost 
growth (Brown, Eremenko, & Collopy, 2009). 
A. CURRENT SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
1. A Brief Introduction to Orbits 
There are essentially three types of Earth orbits: high Earth and geosynchronous 
Earth orbit (GEO); medium Earth orbit (MEO); and low Earth orbit (LEO).  Low Earth 
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orbit starts just above the top of the atmosphere, while high Earth orbit begins about one 
tenth of the way to the Moon, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Weather and communications 
satellites tend to have a high Earth orbit, farthest away from the surface.  Satellites that 
orbit in a medium (mid) Earth orbit include navigation and specialty satellites, designed 
to monitor a particular region.  Most scientific satellites, including NASA’s Earth 
Observing System fleet and the International Space Station (ISS), have a low Earth orbit. 
 
 
Figure 2.   An Illustration of Classifying Orbits by Altitude (From Riebeek & 
Simmon, 2009) 
 
The height of the orbit, or distance between the satellite and Earth’s surface, 
determines how quickly the satellite moves around the Earth—the higher a satellite’s 
orbit, the slower it moves.  Figure 3 provides an illustration of orbital speed at selected 
altitudes.  The length of each red arrow in the illustration represents the distance traveled 
by a satellite in an hour.  An Earth-orbiting satellite’s motion is mostly controlled by 
Earth’s gravity.  As satellites get closer to Earth, the pull of gravity gets stronger, and the 
satellite moves more quickly.  A typical LEO satellite, for example, requires about 90 




Figure 3.   An Illustration of Orbital Speed at Selected Altitudes (From Riebeek & 
Simmon, 2009) 
 
Certain orbital altitudes have special properties, like a geosynchronous orbit, in 
which a satellite travels around the Earth exactly once each day.  For this reason, weather 
satellites are typically placed in GEO to maintain a constant view of the Earth for 
observing weather patterns.  At 384,403 kilometers from the center of the Earth, the 
moon completes a single orbit in 28 days. 
2. DoD Satellite Systems in GEO and MEO 
The DoD uses the properties of these orbital regions for the implementation of 
their satellite programs.  GEO is used extensively for communications and C4ISR 
satellites, while MEO is preferred for Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.  I 
examined seven DoD satellite acquisition programs, five GEO (three C4ISR and two 
communication), and two MEO GPS programs. 
a. Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) High 
The Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) High program is an integrated 
system consisting of multiple space and ground elements.  The constellation architecture 
for SBIRS High (occasionally referred to as SBIRS GEO) includes GEO satellites (with 
highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors), ground stations, and communication links.  SBIRS 
is a key C4ISR system that is part of North America’s missile early warning and defense 
systems.  The SBIRS constellation consists of infrared (IR) sensor payloads on host 
satellites in HEO and two IR sensors each on dedicated SBIRS satellites in GEO 
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(Department of Defense, 2011e).  My research focused on the procurement of the six 
GEO satellites: two research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E) satellites, and 
four procurement satellites in orbit. 
b. Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) 
The Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) provides 
high data rate military satellite communications (SATCOM) services to the DoD. TSAT 
is a key to global net-centric operations.  As the spaceborne element of the Global 
Information Grid (GIG), it extends the GIG and provides improved connectivity and data 
transfer capability to the users without terrestrial connections.  Utilizing Internet Protocol 
(IP) routing, it connects thousands of users through networks rather than limited point-to-
point connections. TSAT enables protected communications on the move (COTM) to 
small highly mobile users and provides high data rate connections to ISR platforms.  
TSAT provides extremely high frequency (EHF), X-band, Ka-band, and laser services.  
The TSAT program consists of a five-satellite constellation (with a sixth satellite 
procured to ensure mission availability), TSAT Satellite Operations Centers (TSOC) for 
on-orbit control, TSAT Mission Operations Systems (TMOS) for network management, 
and ground gateways.  The terminal segment provides users with access to space C4ISR 
products and services (Department of Defense, 2004).  My research focused on the 
procurement of the six GEO satellites.   
c. Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF) 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) is a joint Service satellite 
communications system that provides global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant 
communications for high priority military ground, sea, and air assets.  It is the Next-Stage 
C4ISR Bandwidth satellite program to form the secure, hardened backbone of the 
Pentagon’s future military SATCOM programs after the cancellation of the higher 
capacity TSAT program (Defense Industry Daily, 2012).  The system consists of four 
satellites in a GEO constellation that provides continuous EHF extended data rate (XDR) 
coverage between 65 degrees north and 65 degrees south latitude.  The AEHF operational 
system is composed of three segments: space (the satellites); mission control (with 
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associated communications links); and terminals (the users). The space segment consists 
of a cross-linked constellation of satellites to provide worldwide coverage. The mission 
control segment controls satellites on orbit, monitors satellite health, and provides 
communication system planning and monitoring.  The terminal segment includes fixed 
and mobile ground terminals, ship and submarine terminals, and airborne terminals 
(Department of Defense, 2011a).  My research focused on the procurement of the six 
GEO satellites: two RDT&E satellites, and four procurement satellites in orbit. 
d. Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)  
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) is a narrowband military 
SATCOM system that supports a worldwide, multi-Service population of mobile and 
fixed-site terminal users in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band, providing increased 
communications capabilities to smaller terminals while still supporting interoperability to 
legacy terminals.  MUOS adapts a commercial third generation wideband code division 
multiple access (WCDMA) cellular phone network architecture and combines it with 
GEO satellites (in place of cell towers) to provide a new and more capable UHF military 
SATCOM system.  MUOS includes operational satellites, a ground control and network 
management system, and a new waveform for user terminals. The space portion is 
comprised of a constellation of four GEO satellites.  The ground system includes the 
transport, network management, satellite control, and associated infrastructure to both fly 
the satellites and manage the users’ communications (Department of Defense, 2011c).  
My research focused on the procurement of the four GEO satellites.   
e. Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) augments the Defense Satellite 
Communications System III (DSCS III), and the Global Broadcast Service Phase II.  
WGS is a fully duplexed communications platform offering warfighters a significant 
increase in capacity, connectivity, and interoperability. It provides high-capacity and 
digitally channelized service at both X and Ka frequency bands, opening up a new two-
way Ka communication capability. This highly flexible communications satellite design 
leverages commercial processes, practices, and technology to provide a wideband 
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payload compatible with existing and future terminals.  The costs associated with this 
acquisition are greatly reduced compared to comparable programs through an 
international partnership cooperative agreement in exchange for access to the WGS 
constellation.   Member countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand (Department of Defense, 2011f).  My research focused on 
the procurement of the eight GEO satellites.   
f. Navstar Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR GPS) 
The Navstar Global Positioning System (Navstar GPS) is a space-based 
radio positioning, navigation, and time distribution system.  The modernized portion of 
the program is often referred to as GPS IIF.  GPS IIF consists of twelve satellites and 
provides improved accuracy, greater security, anti-jam capabilities, and a dedicated 
civilian safety-of-life signal, while maintaining baseline legacy GPS performance. 
Military mission areas supported include navigation and position fixing; air interdiction; 
close air support; special operations; strategic attack; counter-air and aerospace defense; 
theater and tactical command, control, communications and intelligence; precision 
munitions guidance; and ground/sea warfare. GPS IIF also carries a suite of nuclear 
detonation detection system sensors as a secondary payload. These sensors provide 
worldwide, near real-time, three-dimensional location of nuclear detonations (Department 
of Defense, 2011d).  My research focused on the procurement of the 12 MEO satellites, 
GPS IIF. 
g. Global Positioning System III (GPS IIIA) 
GPS is a satellite-based radio navigation system that provides precise, 
continuous, all-weather, common-grid positioning, velocity, navigation, and time 
reference capability to civil, commercial, and military users worldwide. It provides 
signals users can process to determine accurate position, velocity, and time.  GPS III is 
the next generation of space vehicle (SV) that provides an international standard available 
on a continuous worldwide basis free of direct user fees.  The first eight satellites, SVs 
01–08, are the part of the program known as GPS IIIA.  The program provides increased 
anti-jam power to the Earth coverage M-code signals and a capability to insert future 
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capabilities with the acquisition of additional SVs (Department of Defense, 2011b).  My 
research focused on the procurement of the eight MEO satellites, GPS IIIA. 
3. DoD Satellite System Comparison 
I examined seven DoD satellite acquisition programs, five GEO (three C4ISR and 
two communication) and two MEO GPS programs, to understand and quantify the 
following parameters: production time, total cost, unit cost, and design life.   
I calculated production time from the year the requirements document was signed, 
to the year when the system achieved, or was projected to reach, full operational 
capability (FOC).   
The total cost used in this project was specifically the defense acquisition-
defined2 program acquisition cost.  Program acquisition cost is a multi-appropriation 
cost.  It consists of the estimated cost of development RDT&E, procurement, and system-
specific military construction (MILCON) necessary to acquire the defense system.  
RDT&E costs are accumulated from the point in time when the DoD acquisition program 
is designated by title as a program element or major project within a program element. 
Military construction costs include only those projects that directly support and uniquely 
identify with the system.  This is the complete cost (total cost) of acquiring a weapon 
system that is ready to operate.   
It is important to emphasize that program acquisition cost is only the cost of 
acquiring a satellite system; it does not include launch and support costs.  Procurement of 
satellites and launch services are funded separately – typically two years prior to launch.  
Generally speaking, the first two satellites of a new system are purchased with RDT&E 
funding and the remainder of the satellites are purchased with procurement funding.  Also 
funded separately, support costs are funded subsequent to program acquisition and 
launch.  As an example of the relative expense of each cost, the 2013 costs for space-
based and related systems are: satellites $4.1 billion; support $2.1 billion; and launch $1.8 
billion (Department of Defense, 2012).  
                                                 
2 Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, Fourteenth Edition, July 2011.  Retrieved 
from:  https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/2464.aspx  
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The unit cost used in this project was specifically the defense acquisition-defined3 
program acquisition unit cost (PAUC).  PAUC is computed by dividing the program 
acquisition cost (total cost) by the program acquisition quantity (number of satellites).  
Program acquisition quantity is the total number of fully configured end items, to include 
research and development (R&D) units, a DoD component intends to buy through the life 
of the program (number of satellites), as approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). This quantity may extend beyond 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) years but shall be consistent with the current 
approved program.  The PAUC and average procurement unit cost (APUC) are the 
subject of the unit cost reports (UCRs).  Programs for which the current estimate of either 
the PAUC or APUC has increased by 15% or more over the currently approved 
acquisition program baseline (APB) must report a unit cost breach to the congressional 
defense committees.   
From this data, I calculated the yearly cost for the system over the system’s 
design life cycle by dividing the total cost by the system life.  Then I calculated the yearly 
cost for the system over the system’s design life cycle for an individual satellite by 
dividing the yearly cost by the number of satellites.  My findings are summarized in 
Table 1.   
All of the cost numbers are in 2011 U.S. dollars.  Only the C4ISR system types 
were include in the GEO average calculation.  The WGS system cost data appears 
anomalous because the costs associated with the program were greatly reduced compared 
to comparable programs through an international partnership cooperative agreement in 





                                                 
3 Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, Fourteenth Edition, July 2011.  Retrieved 
from:  https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/2466.aspx  
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Table 1.   A Time and Cost Comparison of DoD Satellite Systems in GEO and MEO 














per Sat $M 
SBIRS C4ISR GEO 6 22 17699.8 2949.97 12 1474.98 245.83 
TSAT C4ISR GEO 6 17 18920.7 3153.45 14 1351.48 225.25 
AEHF C4ISR GEO 6 17 13474.2 2245.70 14 962.44 160.41 
MUOS Comm GEO 4 15 7036.6 1172.77 14 502.61 125.65 
WGS Comm GEO 8 15 3868.4 483.55 14 276.31 34.54 
GEO Average* 6 18.7 16698.2 2783.04 13.3 1262.97 210.49 
NAVSTAR GPS MEO 12 12 6581.4 199.44 12 548.45 45.70 
GPS III GPS MEO 8 12 1469.3 521.16 15 97.95 12.24 
MEO Average 10 12 4025.4 360.30 13.5 323.20 28.97 
*C4ISR system types only       
 
From Table 1, an empirical analysis would indicate that placing satellites in lower 
orbits produces several desirable results in all but one category.  The production time for 
smaller satellites in a lower orbit is significantly less, and both the total cost and the unit 
cost are lower.  Additionally, with the system design life being approximately equal for 
both orbits, the smaller satellite in a lower orbit also provides a lower yearly cost over the 
system design life cycle, and a lower yearly cost over the system design life cycle for an 
individual satellite.  One notable exception to the across-the-board benefits of the MEO 
satellites is the number of satellites required.  Because of their closer proximity to Earth 
and subsequent faster velocity, more satellites are required to attain the same coverage 
area provided by GEO satellites.  From Table 1, it takes nearly double the number of 
MEO satellites compared to GEO satellites.  Despite the greater number of satellites 
required, the MEO satellite total cost is still far less than the GEO satellite system 
because the unit cost is still far less for the smaller MEO satellites.  
Less expensive satellites and less expensive satellite systems that can be produced 
faster are desirable attributes and would seem to obviate the production of GEO satellites.  
However, they are conducting different missions.  The GEO satellites are providing 
C4ISR (the focus of this project) and communication functions, while the MEO satellites 
are providing GPS capability.  Further investigation is warranted to preclude a deductive 
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fallacy that indicates the LEO satellites would follow the time and cost extrapolation and 
be even cheaper than the MEO satellites and faster to produce.  Additionally, as the GEO 
and MEO satellites are conducting different mission, LEO satellites must be able to fulfill 
the desired C4ISR mission.  My proposed systems in this project address both the cost 
and mission issues. 
B. PROPOSED SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
By using systems engineering and implementing a progressive evaluation plan—
from conceptual design to preliminary system design, and from detailed design and 
development to production and system utilization—the program attains increased 
confidence in the technical solution and minimizes the costs associated with 
incorporating changes and system modifications.  Waiting until later in the life cycle 
before detecting a potential problem, and having to incorporate a late change, can be 
costly.  Thus, the implementation of a progressive and evolving plan is preferred by both 
PMs and engineers, with the objective to commence with the satellite performance 
validation effort as early as possible, providing that the results are meaningful overall.   
It is important to emphasize the significance of reliability within the total 
spectrum of the design-related requirements and activities necessary in order to meet the 
systems engineering objectives.  In the past, engineering emphasis has been placed 
primarily on determining the reliability requirements for the various individual elements 
of a system versus addressing the requirements for the system as an entity and integrating 
those requirements at the system level, as well as on integrating the reliability 
requirements pertaining to the people, facilities, data/information, processes, and the like.  
From a systems engineering perspective, the reliability of all the elements of a system 
should be considered as an integrated entity (T. Huynh, personal communication4, May 
2011). 
                                                 
4 From class lecture notes: Systems Engineering for Acquisition Managers (SE4011), Department of 
Systems Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School.  
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1. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
Most scientific satellites and many weather satellites are in a nearly circular, low 
Earth orbit. The satellite’s inclination depends on what the satellite was launched to 
monitor. A satellite launched to monitor rainfall in the tropics, for example, would have a 
relatively low inclination (35 degrees), staying near the equator to allow its instruments to 
concentrate on the tropics as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   A Sample Image Depicting One Half of the Observations Made in a Single 
Day by a Low Inclination LEO Satellite (From Riebeek & Simmon, 
2009) 
 
Conversely, many satellites used to observe Earth have a nearly polar orbit.  In 
this highly inclined orbit, the satellite moves around the Earth from pole to pole.  During 
one half of the orbit, the satellite views the daytime side of the Earth. At the pole, the 
satellite crosses over to the nighttime side of Earth.  As the satellites orbit, the Earth turns 
underneath. By the time the satellite crosses back into daylight, it is over the region 
adjacent to the area seen in its last orbit.  In a 24-hour period, polar orbiting satellites will 
view most of the Earth twice: once in daylight and once in darkness. 
Just as the GEO satellites have a sweet spot over the equator that lets them stay 
over one spot on Earth (geostationary orbit), the polar-orbiting satellites have a sweet  
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spot that allows them to stay in one time. This orbit is a sun-synchronous orbit, which 
means that whenever and wherever the satellite crosses the equator, the local solar time 
on the ground is always the same.   
Because LEO orbits are not geostationary, a network (or “constellation” or 
“cluster”) of satellites is required to provide continuous coverage.  Lower orbits aid 
remote sensing satellites because of the added detail that can be gained.  Remote sensing 
satellites can also take advantage of sun-synchronous LEO orbits at an altitude of about 
800 km (500 mi) and near polar inclination. The Environmental Satellite (Envisat) 
launched by the European Space Agency (ESA) is one example of an Earth observation 
satellite that made use of this particular type of LEO to service the continuity of 
European Remote-Sensing Satellite missions, providing additional observational 
parameters to improve environmental studies. 
2. CubeSat Architecture 
In a separate but related research effort, I recommend a multi-INT data collection 
system-of-systems infrastructure for low-cost, low-latency, cross-communicating, small 
modular LEO satellites for improved intelligence collection and satellite systems 
acquisition (Staab, 2012). The proposed network of satellite nodes can collect and 
process intelligence information autonomously at the satellite node, and thus minimize 
data transmission to Earth.  Additionally, this minimizes the power requirements onboard 
satellites for transmission, making it possible for a small, low-power, bandwidth-limited 
nanosatellite to provide a low-cost, fast-to-orbit solution to replace large, high-power, 
high-bandwidth (but expensive) GEO satellites. 
A LEO satellite constellation architecture is well suited for use in multi-INT data 
collection and transmission to Earth.  A satellite in LEO is also well positioned to obtain 
high-quality, remote-sensing data.  Not all satellites need to communicate with receiving 
stations on Earth—they just need to communicate with each other, with selected satellites 
used for transmitting to receiving stations on Earth.  This constellation architecture 
contains multiple nodes that all collect and process multi-INT data, cross-communicate 
that information with other nodes, then send the information to Earth through a master 
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node.  This architecture provides for true global coverage and allows mission operators to 
access processed information directly, bypassing the very slow and manpower-intensive 
data processing that would have otherwise been required by analysts at an intelligence 
center.  Finally, this setup enables multiple missions to share the satellite data.  
One nanosatellite that is currently available commercially is the CubeSat (Cuboid 
Satellite spacecraft unit), shown in Figure 5.  The CubeSat offers a modular, scalable, and 
standardized plug-and-play design that suits the needs of the proposed satellite 
constellation.  Individual CubeSat mobile nodes are configured with one or more sensors 
and internal module processing cards.   
 
 
Figure 5.   A Depiction of the Commercially Available CubeSat’s Modular, 




With regard to modularity, the internal modules have three to five slots available 
for processors and command and control (C2).  The C2 module occupies one of the 
modules and the transceiver occupies a second module for sensor collection and 
crosslinking, leaving modules three through five available for data processing.  
With regard to scalability, the CubeSat can vary in size by connecting units 
together.  The base unit size is a “1U” CubeSat (1 unit Cuboid Satellite spacecraft unit) 
and has a form factor of 1 kg and 100 x 100 x 100 mm.  This scalable CubeSat design 
allows for flexibility in the use of satellite constellation employment.  A larger 3U 
CubeSat (three CubSats connected together to form one satellite) can be used to produce 
more power and to allow for the additional transceiver modules to communicate with 
additional nodes or for slightly larger transceivers with larger bandwidth capability (and 
greater power consumption) to be installed.  Furthermore, a 3U CubeSat has more battery 
capacity to help ensure that the master node remains active during periods in which 
power production is limited by the lack of solar energy to the photovoltaic solar panels. 
3. System F6 Architecture 
The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) System F6 Program5 
seeks to demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of a LEO satellite architecture wherein 
the functionality of a traditional “monolithic” spacecraft is delivered by a cluster of 
wirelessly interconnected modules capable of sharing their resources and utilizing 
resources found elsewhere in the cluster. Such architecture enhances the adaptability and 
survivability of space systems, while shortening development timelines and reducing the 
barrier to entry for participation in the national security space industry.   
The program seeks to enable the emergence of a space “global commons” which 
would enhance the mutual security posture of all participants through interdependence.  
A key program goal is the industry-wide promulgation of open interface standards for the 
sustainment and development of future fractionated systems and low-cost commercial 
hardware for the sustained development of future fractionated systems beyond the 
                                                 
5 This material is declared a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in 
the United States. 
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System F6 demonstration (F6 is an acronym for Future, Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, 
Free-Flying Spacecraft united by Information eXchange).  A depiction of the proposed 
System F6 architecture is provided in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6.   A Depiction of the Proposed System F6 Architecture  (From Eremenko, 
2011) 
 
Two key artifacts will be developed in the course of the program. The first is the 
F6 Developer’s Kit (FDK), which is a set of open-source interface standards, protocols, 
behaviors, and reference implementations, necessary for any party, without any 
contractual relationship to any System F6 performer, to develop a new module that can 
fully participate in a fractionated cluster. The second is the F6 Technology Package 
(F6TP), which is a hardware instantiation of the wireless connectivity, packet-switched 
routing, and encryption capable of hosting the protocol stack and resource-sharing and 
cluster flight software needed to enable an existing spacecraft bus to fully participate in a 
fractionated cluster. In essence, the F6TP is a hardware instantiation of the FDK. 
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4. Space Enabled Effects for Military Engagements (SeeMe) 
Architecture 
Today, the lowest echelon members of the U.S. military deployed in remote 
overseas locations are unable to obtain on-demand satellite imagery in a timely and 
persistent manner for pre-mission planning or intelligence updates.  This is due to lack of 
satellite over-flight opportunities, inability to receive direct satellite downlinks at the 
tactical level, and information flow restrictions.  
Another DARPA project, the Space Enabled Effects for Military Engagements 
(SeeMe) Program,6 aims to provide mobile individual U.S. warfighters access to on-
demand, space-based tactical information in remote and beyond-line-of-sight conditions 
as depicted in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7.   A Depiction of the SeeMe Notional Concept of Operations (From 
Barnhart, 2012) 
                                                 
6 This material is declared a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in 
the United States. 
 29 
If successful, SeeMe will provide small squads and individual teams the ability to 
receive timely imagery of their specific overseas location directly from a small satellite 
with the press of a button—something that is currently not possible from military or 
commercial satellites.   
The program seeks to develop a constellation of small “disposable” satellites, at a 
fraction of the cost of airborne systems, enabling deployed warfighters overseas to access 
SeeMe on existing handheld devices to receive a satellite image of their precise location 
within 90 minutes. DARPA plans SeeMe to be an adjunct to UAV technology, which 
provides local and regional very high resolution coverage, but cannot cover extended 
areas without frequent refueling. SeeMe aims to support warfighters in multiple deployed 
overseas locations simultaneously with no logistics or maintenance costs beyond the 
warfighters’ handheld devices.  
The SeeMe constellation may consist of some two-dozen satellites, each lasting 
60–120 days in a very low Earth orbit before de-orbiting and completely burning up, 
leaving no space debris and causing no re-entry hazard.  It is designed to be produced in 
three months, with a cost goal of $500,000 or less per satellite at production rate.  Using 
this structure, the system is designed to conform to an actual DoD tempo for contingency 
operations (approximately 90 days planning and 90 days operational), as opposed to 
conforming to the satellite and its life optimization. 
The program may leverage DARPA’s Airborne Launch Assist Space Access 
(ALASA) program, which is developing an aircraft-based satellite launch platform for 
payloads on the order of 100 lbm.  ALASA seeks to provide low-cost, rapid launch of 
small satellites into any required orbit, a capability not possible today from fixed ground 
launch sites. 
My research focused on the conservative estimates of 24 satellites, with a 
production time of 90 days, at a cost of $500,000 per satellite, and a system life of 90 
days.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter III Section A, I examined the current acquisition process and system 
engineering approach to multi-INT data collection via satellite.  I identified and 
enumerated the current C4ISR acquisitions process, specifically focusing on time 
(production time and system life) and cost.  Additionally, in Chapter III Section B, I 
introduced several proposed low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO satellite 
systems for improved multi-INT data collection.   
A. ANALYSIS 
1. Time and Cost Savings 
For my system comparison of current GEO and proposed LEO C4ISR satellites, I 
focused on the same parameters of time (production time and system life) and cost, using 
the GEO and MEO averages attained in Table 1, and the projected LEO estimates from 
the SeeMe program.  My findings are summarized in Table 2.   
 
Table 2.   A Time and Cost Comparison of DoD Satellite Systems in GEO and LEO 














per Sat $M 
C4ISR GEO Average* 6 18.7 16698.2 2783.04 13.3 1262.97 210.49 
GPS MEO Average* 10 12 4025.4 360.30 13.5 323.20 28.97 
C4ISR LEO per Mission 24 0.25 12.0 0.50 0.25 12.00 0.50 
20 LEO Missions 480 0.25 240.0 0.50 0.25 240.00 0.50 
40 LEO Missions 960 0.25 480.0 0.50 0.25 480.00 0.50 
80 LEO Missions 1920 0.50 960.0 0.50 0.25 960.00 0.50 
*Data from Table 1        
 
It is immediately striking that again, as discovered in Table 1, placing satellites in 
lower orbits produces several desirable results in all but two categories: system life and 
number of satellites.  The production time for LEO satellites in a lower orbit is 
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dramatically less, and both the total cost and the unit cost are lower.  Additionally, the 
LEO satellite in a lower orbit also provides a lower yearly cost over the system design 
life cycle, and a lower yearly cost over the system design life cycle for an individual 
satellite.  However, yearly costs must be considered differently for the LEO C4ISR 
application because of system life. 
As discussed earlier, the LEO satellite cluster architecture redefines the C4ISR 
system paradigm.  The current system focus is on the satellite, not the mission, thereby 
creating a different requirement for system life.  Satellites are currently built to achieve a 
long, reliable, safe system life, resulting in marginal systems that need several redesigns 
or major changes to achieve functionality, thus increasing system development time and 
cost, and unit production cost.  The systems that I have proposed are designed to conform 
to an actual DoD operational tempo of 90–180 days for contingency operations.  In this 
system, the unit cost at production rate is fixed and remains constant.  This fixed unit cost 
produces two results: the yearly cost per satellite is fixed and remains constant; and the 
yearly cost is equivalent to the total cost.  Utilizing a system based on mission needs, 
only the amount of satellites required to fulfill the mission are procured each year.  
Therefore, yearly costs fluctuate in my proposed systems based on mission needs.   
In this new system, one 90-day mission requires a cluster of 24 satellites.  Each 
90-day mission, therefore, costs $12 million (24 satellites at $0.5 million each) as shown 
in Table 2.  To illustrate the practicable savings of my proposed system in which only the 
amount of satellites required to fulfill the mission are procured each year, I will provide 
three examples.  If for example, in a given year there is a requirement for 1800 days of 
coverage (e.g., twenty 90-day missions or ten 180-day missions), requiring 480 satellites 
(one 24-satellite constellation for each 90-day period of coverage), the yearly cost would 
be $240 million for that year, shown in Table 2 as 20 LEO Missions, but it would remain 
well below the $1.26 billion cost of a GEO satellite system for that same year.  Suppose 
that in the following year, the requirement doubles.  Now the requirement is for 3600 
days of coverage (e.g., forty 90-day missions, twenty 180-day missions, or ten full-year 
missions), requiring 960 satellites.  The yearly cost would then double to $480 million for 
that year, shown in Table 2 as 40 LEO Missions, but it would again remain well below 
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the $1.26 billion cost of a GEO satellite system for that same year.  In the following year, 
the requirement doubles yet again.  Now the requirement is for 7200 days of coverage 
(e.g., eighty 90-day missions, forty 180-day missions, or twenty full-year missions), 
requiring 1920 satellites.  The yearly cost would then double again to $960 million for 
that year, shown in Table 2 as 80 LEO Missions, but it would again remain below the 
$1.26 billion cost of a GEO satellite system for that same year.  Indeed, the LEO mission 
requirement would need to rise to 2526 satellites in a year, or 9540 days of coverage 
(e.g., one hundred and six 90-day missions, fifty-three 180-day missions, or twenty-seven 
full-year missions), to exceed the yearly cost of a GEO satellite system. 
The extrapolation of mission requirement scenarios in the examples provided 
highlights two key factors associated with this new system that conforms to an actual 
DoD operational tempo of 90–180 days for contingency operations.  First, the new 
system provides lower yearly costs for all mission needs that cumulatively and 
collectively require less than 2526 satellites in a year.  Second, production capacity must 
be considered when determining production time.  Production time will increase once 
maximum production capacity has been reached.  Production capacity should therefore be 
determined by a statistical analysis of 90-day mission requirement historical data.  If for 
example, the maximum 90-day mission usage is determined to be 3600 days of coverage 
(i.e. forty 90-day missions) requiring 960 satellites, production capacity should be set at 
960 satellites per 90-day production period.  If this production capacity is exceeded, 
production time will begin to increase with the number of satellites required to meet 
mission needs.  If for example, in a given year there is a requirement for 7200 days of 
coverage (e.g., eighty 90-day missions or forty 180-day missions), requiring 1920 
satellites, the production time would double to 180 days, shown in Table 2 as 80 LEO 
Missions.  With production capacity set at 960 satellites per 90-day production period as 
in the example, the proposed LEO system could sustain 40 year-long missions (producing 
3840 total satellites), continuously throughout an entire year.  
The other exception to the across-the-board benefits of LEO satellites is the 
number of satellites required.  Despite the greater number of satellites required, the LEO 
satellite total cost is still far less than the GEO satellite system because of the extremely 
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low, fixed unit cost.  These low-cost, fast-production satellites can be used to provide 
C4ISR and communication functions currently provided by GEO satellite systems.   
Another important cost saving is found in system size and weight.  The massive 
SBIRS GEO C4ISR satellite dimensions are 7 ft x 6.3 ft x 19.7 ft (stowed) and 48.6 ft x 
22.4 ft x 19.7 ft (deployed).  The launch weight is 10,656 pounds (4,833 kilograms) and 
the on-orbit weight is 5,603 pounds (2,547 kilograms).  In stark contrast, a CubeSat 
cuboid spacecraft unit has a form factor of 100 mm3 and weighs only 1 kg.  Similarly, the 
SeeMe satellite is designed to be compatible with the ALASA delivery vehicle at roughly 
20–30 inches in diameter and 20–32 inches in length +/- 25%, and a weight of 45 kg. 
The size and weight cost savings are found in both the reduction of expensive 
construction materials, and in the fuel costs of placing the space vehicle in orbit.  The fuel 
costs are reduced two ways for the LEO satellite.  First, the smaller satellites require less 
fuel because they weigh less.  Second, they require less fuel because they are traveling a 
shorter distance: 320–400 km for the International Space Station (ISS) in LEO, as 
opposed to 35,786 km for a geostationary GEO.  As noted in Chapter III Section A, the 
2013 launch cost for space-based and related systems is nearly half the cost (44%) of 
acquiring current DoD satellite systems.  Although funded separately, they are both part 
of the DoD budget. Therefore, any success in reducing the size and weight of current 
systems will not only decrease acquisition costs, it will also dramatically decrease the 
launch costs that are drawn from the aggregate DoD budget.  
In addition to the cost savings found in production, launch, and maintenance, a 
militarily significant cost savings is replacement cost due to enemy action.  The complex, 
large GEO satellite presents a lucrative target to an enemy and could be destroyed or 
rendered inoperative by a single missile strike.  Conversely, the proposed small-satellite 
cluster would be difficult to detect, but even if detected it would be infeasible to destroy 
an entire cluster, or multiple clusters servicing multiple missions.  Considering unit cost, 
the loss of a single GEO satellite would be enormous.  Considering the production time 
of the GEO satellite, the effect of losing of a single satellite would be devastating to the 
DoD’s warfighting capability.  From a military engagement perspective, time and cost 
savings again favor the utilization of a small, distributed, multiple-target cluster of 
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relatively inexpensive, quickly produced, fast-to-orbit satellites.  Such a system would be 
more difficult to detect, engage and destroy, and would also be relatively quick and 
inexpensive to replace when compared to the GEO systems currently in use. 
2. MUIRS Attributes 
A maintainability, upgradeability, interoperability, reliability, and safety/security 
(MUIRS) analysis of low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO satellites for 
improved multi-INT data collection reveals benefits in all categories.  The improvements 
in the first four MUIRS categories are facilitated by the LEO system’s brief system life—
an attribute that initially seemed undesirable, but that was ultimately revealed to be 
perfectly suited to the newly proposed paradigm of producing systems designed with a 
focus on the mission, not the satellite.   
Maintainability concerns are essentially eliminated for the LEO satellite 
constellation architecture.  Small modular LEO satellites have a short life cycle and do 
not require maintenance once in orbit.  Instead of struggling for fourteen years to 
maintain a GEO satellite that is orbiting over 22,000 miles from Earth,  the proposed 
LEO system is designed to last only 60–120 days before de-orbiting and completely 
burning up, leaving no space debris and causing no re-entry hazard.   
Upgradability is inherent in the proposed LEO satellite systems.  Their short 
system life requires them to be replaced frequently and enables frequent upgrades.  A 
LEO satellite cluster can be in orbit within 90 days loaded with the latest cutting-edge 
hardware and software technology, whereas an end-of-life GEO asset is relying on 
technology that is over a decade old (with the exception of some software upgrades that 
can be accomplished through remote access).  With technological capability doubling 
every two years as observed in Moore’s law, GEO satellite capabilities are nearly 
obsolete while the system is still in use.   
Interoperability is similarly refreshed frequently as new standards are developed.  
Each new generation of satellites incorporates updates to maintain interoperability with 
new technologies in a constantly changing net-centric environment.  A pre-Internet GEO 
satellite would not be configured to accommodate IP traffic for example. 
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Reliability concerns, like the maintainability attribute, are nearly eliminated for 
the LEO satellite architecture.  An architecture that utilizes a cluster of cross-
communicating modular satellites allows for a scalable distribution of the processing 
resources in small satellites needed to produce the results that can be attained with a 
single large satellite.  In this distributed architecture, the reliability required of each 
individual cross-communicating small satellite is far less than that required of a single 
large satellite—any failed satellite within the constellation can be compensated by 
another satellite in its network.  The GEO satellite architecture is also more vulnerable to 
data integrity loss and data interception because of the constant communication to 
terrestrial base stations.  Additionally, these traditional GEO satellites need to be built to 
extremely high reliability standards due to massive repair and replacement costs. 
Safety and security is also increased for LEO C4ISR satellites because of the 
distributed constellation architecture.  One of the primary objectives of the System F6 
program is to explore the benefits of a LEO satellite architecture wherein the 
functionality of a traditional “monolithic” spacecraft is delivered by a cluster of 
wirelessly interconnected modules capable of sharing their resources and utilizing 
resources found elsewhere in the cluster.  Such architecture enhances the adaptability and 
survivability of space systems, while shortening development timelines and reducing the 
barrier to entry for participation in the national security space industry.  As in other basic 
military applications, a small, distributed, multiple-target cluster of satellites that can be 
quickly launched into LEO travelling at over 17,000 mph presents a more difficult and 
less lucrative target than a single, massive satellite in GEO. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The current acquisition process for C4ISR GEO satellites is inadequate when 
compared to the proposed LEO satellite architectures.  The proposed low latency, cross-
communicating, modular LEO satellite systems for improved multi-INT data collection 
presented in this project provide benefits in all of the areas evaluated.  Specifically, 
production time, cost, MUIRS attributes, and system life all favor the proposed LEO 
satellite architecture.   
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The production time for LEO satellites in a lower orbit is dramatically less; LEO 
satellites are designed to be produced in three months, while GEO satellite production 
time averages over 18 years.  Total cost and unit cost are lower for the LEO proposals.  
The yearly cost over the system design life cycle, and the yearly cost over the system 
design life cycle for an individual satellite are also lower for the LEO proposals.  
Additionally, cost savings are found in the LEO architecture through the reduction of 
expensive construction materials, and in reduced fuel costs when placing the space 
vehicle in orbit.  Small LEO satellites require less fuel because they weigh less and they 
are traveling a shorter distance during a much shorter duration (LEO versus GEO).  
MUIRS attributes are facilitated by the LEO system’s brief system life.  
Maintainability concerns are essentially eliminated for the LEO satellite constellation 
architecture that is designed to last only 60–120 days before de-orbiting and completely 
burning up upon re-entry.  Upgradability is inherent; the short system life requires them 
to be replaced frequently and enables frequent upgrades with the latest evolution in 
militarily useful technology.  Interoperability is similarly refreshed frequently to maintain 
interoperability with new technologies in a constantly changing net-centric environment.  
Reliability concerns are nearly eliminated in a distributed constellation architecture where 
the reliability required of each individual cross-communicating small satellite is far less 
in that any failed satellite within the constellation can be compensated by another satellite 
in its network.  Safety and security is also increased using small, distributed, multiple-
target clusters of wirelessly interconnected modules capable of sharing their resources 
and utilizing resources found elsewhere in the cluster.   
Finally, the proposed architecture supports a new paradigm for improved multi-
INT data collection through the utilization of low latency, cross-communicating, modular 
LEO satellite systems designed with a focus on the C4ISR mission, not the satellite and 
its life optimization.  System life must be considered differently in this new paradigm.  
The ephemeral system life in the proposed systems initially seemed undesirable, but was 
ultimately revealed to be perfectly suited to the new paradigm that conforms to the actual 
DoD operational tempo for contingency operations.  In this new system, the low yearly 
costs fluctuate based on mission needs.   
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that the Department of Defense consider a new paradigm for 
improved multi-INT data collection through low latency, cross-communicating, modular 
LEO satellite systems designed with a focus on the C4ISR mission, not the satellite and 
its life optimization.  In this new paradigm, production time and system life conform to 
the actual DoD tempo for contingency operations regarding planning time and 
operational time, respectively.   
The new system would result in smaller, faster-to-orbit satellites that provide the 
most state-of-the-art systems, specifically tailored for the assigned mission.  They could 
be assembled from mostly off-the-shelf components in a plug-and-play fashion, 
depending on mission requirements, resulting in enormous savings—both total cost and 
unit cost—and such systems would achieve across-the-board MUIRS benefits while 
requiring less fuel to launch and achieve orbit. 
B. SUMMARY 
The use of satellites for multi-INT data collection allows the military to conduct 
C4ISR missions around the globe.  However, the time and cost required to produce 
current systems are too great to meet operational needs and do not support MUIRS 
considerations.  A transition is needed from the existing GEO satellite architecture to a 
constellation architecture of low latency, cross-communicating, modular LEO satellites. 
After a literature review of supporting research, I investigated the GEO satellites 
used extensively by the DoD for communications and C4ISR satellites.  I examined seven 
DoD satellite acquisition programs, five GEO (three C4ISR and two communication), 
and two MEO GPS programs.  My examination and data analysis indicated that placing 
satellites in lower orbits produces several desirable results.  The production time, total 
cost, and unit cost were all reduced.  Additionally, the yearly cost for the system and the 
yearly cost for an individual satellite were reduced.  However, I noted that lower orbits 
required more satellites.   
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I then introduced several proposed low latency, cross-communicating, modular 
LEO satellite systems for improved multi-INT data collection, and conducted a system 
comparison of current GEO and proposed LEO C4ISR satellites, focusing on the 
parameters of time (production time and system life) and cost, and included a MUIRS 
assessment.   
The analysis results indicated that the proposed LEO satellite systems provided 
benefits in all of the areas evaluated; production time, cost, MUIRS attributes, and system 
life all favored the proposed architecture.  The production time, total cost, and unit cost 
were all dramatically less, along with the yearly cost for the system and the yearly cost 
for an individual satellite.  Additional savings were found in reduced construction and 
fuel costs.  MUIRS benefits were derived from the LEO system’s brief system life.  
Maintainability concerns are essentially eliminated, upgradability is inherent, and 
interoperability is similarly refreshed.  Reliability concerns are nearly eliminated through 
redundancy, and safety and security is increased using a small, distributed constellation.   
I then concluded that my proposed architecture supports a new paradigm for 
improved multi-INT data collection through the utilization of low latency, cross-
communicating, modular LEO satellite systems designed with a focus on the C4ISR 
mission, not the satellite and its life optimization.  In this new paradigm, production time 
and system life conform to the actual DoD tempo for contingency operations regarding 
planning time and operational time, respectively.   
Finally, I recommended that the Department of Defense consider this new 
paradigm that would result in smaller, faster-to-orbit satellites that provide the most state-
of-the-art systems, specifically tailored for the assigned mission requirements, resulting 
in enormous total cost and unit cost savings, and achieving across-the-board MUIRS 
benefits while requiring less fuel to launch and achieve orbit. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Engineering Development 
Engineering areas for development are already underway as proposed in Chapter 
III Section B.  Communication channels will need to be constantly updated and improved 
 41 
to allow for greater bandwidth and IP-based connectivity for the satellite cluster’s 
connection to Earth, and a cross-communicating, self-healing, ad-hoc network connection 
within the constellation.  Power considerations must also be addressed to include 
reducing the power required of onboard components, and increasing power supply from 
advanced photovoltaics or advanced energy storage devices such as improved batteries or 
fuel cells.  Launch vehicles must also be developed to accommodate frequent deployment 
of satellite constellations.  Satellite constellation standards must be developed to ensure 
modular compatibility (within the system) and interoperability (between systems).  
Ground link systems must be developed to allow users on the ground to access the multi-
INT C4ISR data with low latency and in a user friendly format.  Finally, there is a need to 
continue the development of smaller and higher resolution sensors. 
2. Defense Acquisition Program Management 
The defense acquisition system also has several areas for development.  Further 
investigation should be conducted regarding unit cost for the proposed systems.  
Specifically, the operational requirements introduced in Chapter IV Section A should be 
compared to nominal “peace-time” mission years, and high-use mission years that have 
been experienced in recent sustained overseas combat operations. This comparison could 
be used when evaluating the cross-over point (the example used in this project was a 
LEO mission requirement for 2526 satellites in a year, or 9540 days of coverage) where 
the yearly cost of the proposed systems exceeds the yearly cost of a current GEO satellite 
system.  The technical and operational requirements must also be clearly defined for the 
proposed systems so that developmental testing (DT) parameters can be established to 
ensure the proposed systems meet the required technical specifications and so that 
operational testing (OT) parameters can be developed to fulfill all of the critical 
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